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<H1>I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The ecological health of the global oceans, and their continued ability to withstand a 
pervasive and ever-increasing array of anthropogenic pressures, represents an enduring cause 
for scientific and regulatory concern. In recent years, concerted international attention has 
been focused towards promoting the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity located in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). Most tangibly, in 2015, the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution1 confirming an intention to 
develop an internationally legally binding instrument (ILBI) under the framework of the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)2 to advance the regulation of ABNJ.3 This 
was preceded by an extensive series of meetings convened between 2006 and 2015 by the Ad 
Hoc Open-Ended Informal Group to study issues related to the conservation and sustainable 
management of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction (BBNJ), 
which was established under an earlier UNGA resolution4 and which identified four key 
themes to be addressed through the ILBI. Respectively, these themes encompass marine 
genetic resources; area-based management tools; environmental impact assessments; and 
capacity building and the transfer of marine technology,5 which were all considered to have 
been under-regulated within UNCLOS. Pursuant to Resolution 69/212, a Preparatory 
Committee held four meetings between 2016 and 2017 to identify points of convergence and 
                                                          
This work was funded and conducted under the Nereus Program of the Nippon Foundation 
(www.nereusprogram.org). The author thanks the editors of the Yearbook of International Environmental Law 
for their insightful comments; the usual caveats apply. 
1 UNGA Resolution 69/292 (6 July 2015), para 1. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, 1883 UNTS 396 (UNCLOS). 
3 The term ‘areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) is not defined in either UNCLOS or Resolution 69/212, 
supra note 1. Instead, these areas are residual constructs within UNCLOS, denoting the high seas (art 86) and 
the ‘Area’ (art 1(1)). 
4 UNGA Resolution 59/24 (17 September 2004). The reports from the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Group to 
study issues related to the conservation and sustainable management of marine biological diversity beyond areas 
of national jurisdiction are available at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/biodiversityworkinggroup/biodiversityworkinggroup.htm>.  
5 UNGA Resolution 69/292, supra note 1, para 2.  Formatted: Spanish (Spain)
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divergence between the participants6 and to facilitate the elaboration of the ILBI when 
negotiations commence in earnest in 2018.7 Assuming satisfactory progress, the ILBI is 
intended to be concluded in 2020 as the third formal implementing agreement to UNCLOS.8 
The elaboration of a new regulatory stratum for ABNJ is a welcome development, for 
such waters have habitually proved challenging from the standpoint of international 
environmental governance (IEG). ABNJ remain among the least regulated—and, thereby, the 
most ecologically vulnerable—locations on the planet. Indeed, the prevailing regulatory 
philosophy for the high seas has long been one of a broad and perpetual entitlement to 
communal usage, limited only by the nebulous obligation to demonstrate ‘due regard’ to the 
rights of other states when exercising traditional nautical freedoms.9 This has done little to 
deter a frontier mentality towards high seas resources in many quarters. Significant 
governance gaps have also been exposed with respect to ABNJ. While UNCLOS provides a 
broad regulatory framework for maritime conduct in ABNJ, this has not fully addressed 
particular activities undertaken in these areas. Even where governance structures have been 
established, they have not always been endowed with a mandate to regulate the full range of 
activities pursued. The exploitation of resources within ABNJ has therefore often proceeded 
in an under-regulated fashion. Moreover, to date, there has been a marked over-reliance upon 
sectoral regulation, which, while addressing individual matters of pressing concern, has often 
proved to be insufficiently nuanced to effectively protect and manage biodiversity within 
ABNJ. Compounding these structural challenges, the remoteness of these locations frequently 
militates against the effective enforcement of supervisory standards. Against this multi-
faceted regulatory backdrop, the nascent ILBI must facilitate a more effective degree of 
governance for these areas, yet, in the rather stilted vernacular of the process, it should ‘not 
undermine’ the work of the numerous pre-existing regimes and sectoral initiatives operating 
within ABNJ.10 
The governance challenges incumbent in protecting marine biodiversity in ABNJ are 
vividly illustrated in the specific context of the deep-sea environment, which is the focus of 
                                                          
6 Reports available at <http://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom.htm>.  
7 UNGA Resolution 72/249 (24 December 2017), para 3. 
8 Thereby joining the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS of 10 December 1982 , 
1994, 1836 UNTS 42, and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995, 2167 UNTS 88 (UNFSA). 
9 UNCLOS, supra note 2, art 87(2). The International Seabed Authority (ISA) provides an additional layer of 
governance for the Area, although its mandate is restricted to oversight of the resources of this part of the 
seabed, which are to be administered for the benefit of humankind.  
10 UNGA Resolution 69/292, supra note 1, para 3. Formatted: Spanish (Spain)
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this article. For centuries, their sheer inaccessibility has inured these areas against 
anthropogenic excesses, preserving by default a fragile, yet essentially untouched and 
surprisingly dynamic and productive, series of ecosystems. In recent decades, however, a 
rapacious combination of technological innovation and commercial necessity has led to a 
dramatically increased footprint of human activities in even the deepest parts of the sea. This 
has inflicted significant damage upon vulnerable deep-water ecosystems in ABNJ, primarily 
due to poorly regulated fishing activities. Since the 1960s, fisheries have steadily progressed 
into offshore areas and deeper waters, as shallow water stocks have become increasingly 
depleted and fishers have been forced to pursue alternative opportunities.11 Acute regulatory 
tensions have subsequently arisen over the continued proliferation of bottom fisheries—
widely understood to be any fishery that uses gear ‘that either contact or are likely to contact 
the sea floor during the course of the fishing operation’12—into ABNJ and at unprecedented 
depths, notwithstanding considerable scientific uncertainty over the impacts of such 
activities.  
The expansion of these practices continued largely unchecked until the late twentieth 
century, when opposition began to mobilize against the use of an array of destructive fishing 
gear in ABNJ. By the late 1990s, bottom fisheries, especially those using heavy trawl nets 
dragged along the seabed itself or across seamounts and other fragile benthic features known 
to entice sizeable aggregations of fish, had attracted international notoriety. As concerns 
mounted over the projected long-term unsustainability of deep-sea fishing upon the target 
stocks, and the damage inflicted upon delicate marine ecosystems in the process, the 
management of bottom fisheries in ABNJ became a global regulatory priority. In the process, 
the development of standards for bottom fisheries has exposed wider governance challenges 
facing deep-water ecosystems in ABNJ as well as the complications inherent in blending 
specific sectoral oversight with more generalized regulatory regimes for the marine 
environment as envisaged by the nascent ILBI. 
The management of deep-sea ecosystems is thus an illuminating example of the past, 
present, and future difficulties facing IEG in ABNJ. Until the present century, many deep-sea 
bottom fisheries were subject to minimal oversight, with such activities falling outside the 
purview of major regulatory structures and instruments. Indeed, regional fisheries 
management organizations (RFMOs)—the traditional multilateral vehicle for fisheries 
                                                          
11 T Morato et al, ‘Fishing Down the Deep’ (2006) 7 Fish and Fisheries 24 at 31. 
12 A Bensch et al, Worldwide Review of Bottom Fisheries in the High Seas (2009) at 2. 
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governance—had either lacked an explicit remit for the management of these stocks or were 
only relatively recently established with respect to significant portions of the high seas, while 
little provision for these particular species and ecosystems had been made under UNCLOS. 
These lacunae meant that certain stocks could become rapidly depleted and deep-sea 
ecosystems irrevocably damaged before meaningful regulation could be applied to such 
fisheries. However, global concerns over the highly destructive nature of bottom fishing have 
crystallized through the adoption of a series of influential UNGA resolutions, calling on 
RFMOs and states to adhere to specific commitments for the protection of vulnerable marine 
ecosystems (VMEs) from the impacts of this type of fishing in the deep-sea environment. The 
political impetus provided by multiple UNGA resolutions has prompted the adoption of 
complementary conservation and management measures by particular actors. These measures 
have also provided a tentative basis for cooperation between regional and sectoral regulators 
of the type identified through the BBNJ process as a desirable consequence of the prospective 
ILBI.  
As this article will demonstrate, there has been considerable progress towards the 
elaboration of uniform standards for the protection of VMEs in the deep-sea environment, 
although deficiencies remain apparent in implementing the current framework. Such 
shortcomings will need to be further addressed in order to fulfill the commitments established 
under this cohort of UNGA resolutions and thus protect VMEs from the adverse 
consequences of deep-sea bottom fisheries in ABNJ. To this end, the second part of this 
article outlines the threats posed to deep-sea ecosystems by the continued proliferation of 
bottom fisheries. Thereafter, the third part traces the emergence of regulatory standards 
towards the protection of VMEs in ABNJ and the development of the pertinent UNGA 
commitments. The fourth part evaluates the progress achieved towards implementing 
commitments, with particular reference to the identification and regulation of fishing 
footprints, the operation of area-based management tools, and the extent to which governance 
gaps have been closed through the actions of RFMOs as well as individual states and entities. 
The fifth part then considers the future governance challenges posed by integrating these 
sectoral approaches within current regimes, while the sixth part advances a series of 
conclusions as to the future regulatory landscape concerning deep-sea ecosystems in the 
context of the prospective ILBI. 
 
<H1>II. FISHING AND DEEP-SEA ECOSYSTEMS: TRENDS AND TROUBLES 
 
5 
 
Bottom fisheries have long posed an under-appreciated threat to the marine environment. 
Although the popular perception of risks to deep-sea ecosystems is dominated by concerns 
over the role of extractive marine industries, it nevertheless remains the case that ‘[f]isheries 
using bottom trawls are the most widespread source of anthropogenic physical disturbance to 
global seabed habitats.’13 The footprint of such fishing varies regionally, but, in particular 
locations—including those notable for an extensive offshore industrial presence—the 
ecological impact of bottom trawling has still been found to be greater than the sum of all 
other anthropogenic activities combined.14 Bottom fishing is not confined to any one 
particular geographical area. As a general trend, however, as fishing activities have steadily 
advanced offshore, there has been a corresponding propensity in recent decades to move into 
deeper waters.15 As stocks on the continental shelf have become progressively depleted, 
demersal fisheries ( those targeting fish whose core habitats comprise the seabed or areas in 
very close proximity to it) have increasingly targeted the upper and mid-sections of the 
continental slope.16 Consequently, the mean depth of global fisheries has expanded fourfold 
since the mid-1960s, accompanied by a steady creep of fishing effort into ABNJ.17  
A definitive accounting of the ecological impact of bottom fisheries remains elusive. 
As Michel Kaiser and colleagues observe, ‘[t]he effects of different fishing gears on the 
seabed vary considerably amongst gear types and according to the environmental context in 
which they are fished.’18 As a general rule, however, gear that is actively dragged along the 
seabed presents a considerably greater risk to benthic ecosystems than that which is statically 
fixed or temporarily placed in a particular location. Indeed, certain equipment, such as traps 
and pots, will ultimately exert a superficial long-term impact upon the marine environment.19 
Others, such as bottom-set gillnets, which are anchored to the seabed and drift with the ocean 
tide, may inflict little damage to the benthos itself yet attract different concerns over their 
scope for incidental catches of non-target species, notably marine mammals. Likewise, 
bottom long-lines are more typically deployed in close proximity to the seabed, yet are 
                                                          
13 JG Hiddink et al, ‘Global Analysis of Depletion and Recovery of Seabed Biota after Bottom Trawling 
Disturbance’ (2017) 114 PNAS 8301 at 8301. 
14 AR Benn et al, ‘Human Activities on the Deep Seafloor in the North East Atlantic: An Assessment of Spatial 
Extent’ (2010) 5 PLoS One e12730. 
15 See W Swartz et al, ‘The Spatial Expansion and Ecological Footprint of Fisheries (1950 to Present)’ (2010) 5 
PLoS One e15143. 
16 Morato, supra note 11 at 25. 
17 EA Norse et al, ‘Sustainability of Deep-Sea Fisheries’ (2012) 36 Marine Policy 307 at 308. 
18 MJ Kaiser et al, ‘Prioritization of Knowledge-Needs to Achieve Best Practices for Bottom Trawling in 
Relation to Seabed Habitats’ (2016) 17 Fish and Fisheries 637 at 639. 
19 F Stephenson et al, ‘Experimental Potting Impacts on Common UK Reef Habitats in Areas of High and Low 
Fishing Pressure’ (2017) 74 ICES Journal of Marine Science 1648 at 1657. 
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generally considered to be less destructive and intrusive, notwithstanding localized concerns 
over their excessive presence in particular areas.20 Ultimately, bottom trawling remains by far 
the most prevalent type of deep-sea fishing gear. Bottom trawling is an umbrella term for the 
use of a variety of trawl gear, the common feature of which is that weighted nets are dragged 
across the seabed, presenting an amplified scope for benthic damage in the process. 
Accordingly, this form of fishing has attracted arguably the greatest degree of regulatory 
attention in the context of ABNJ. 
Bottom trawling has long been ubiquitous at a variety of depths and jurisdictional 
zones, ranging from near-shore waters to highly remote locations in ABNJ, and is considered 
to account for approximately 20–5 percent of all current seafood landings globally.21 Despite 
its recent prominence in international fora, scientific and regulatory unease over the adverse 
impact of large-scale bottom trawling is not a modern phenomenon. Indeed, vivid testimony 
as to the propensity of the national trawler fleet to ‘scour the ground wherever it goes’ was 
presented to a Royal Commission of Enquiry in the United Kingdom as early as 1866,22 while 
quantifiable evidence of an ecological threat posed by trawling has been established in the 
scientific literature since at least the 1930s.23 More recently, concerns have been raised over 
the scraping of vulnerable benthic sediments,24 the gouging of the seabed and damage to 
fragile submarine features,25 the removal of habitat-forming species,26 and the disturbance of 
complex benthic ecosystems that may in turn further compromise fish productivity.27 
Moreover, while bottom trawling results in specific localized environmental impacts, these 
fisheries also represent a significant contribution to the cumulative footprint of anthropogenic 
activities in the global oceans; hence, their effects may be exacerbated in tandem with that of 
                                                          
20 CK Pham et al, ‘Deep-Water Longlining Has Reduced Impact on Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems’ (2014) 
4387 Scientific Reports 1 at 3.  
21 Hiddink, supra note 14 at 8301 (extrapolating global catch data collated by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) since 2009). 
22 RH Thurstan, JP Hawkins and CM Roberts, ‘Origins of the Bottom Trawling Controversy in  the British Isles: 
19th Century Witness Testimonies Reveal Evidence of Early Fishery Declines’ (2014) 15 Fish and Fisheries 506 
at 515. 
23 M Graham, ‘The Trawl Fisheries: A Scientific and National Problem’ (1938) 142 Nature 1143.  
24 FG O’Neill and A Ivanović, ‘The Physical Impact of Towed Demersal Fishing Gears on Soft Sediments’ 
(2016) 73 (Supplement) ICES Journal of Marine Science 5 at 12.  
25 Indeed, evidence of trawling has remained apparent on the seabed in particular locations, even a number of 
years after the cessation of all fishing activities. MR Clark et al, ‘Effects of Fishing on the Benthic Biodiversity 
of Seamounts of the “Graveyard” Complex, Northern Chatham Rise’ (2010) 46 New Zealand Aquatic 
Environment and Biodiversity Report 1. 
26 SF Thrush, KE Ellingsen and K Davis, ‘Implications of Fisheries Impacts to Seabed Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem-Based Management’ (2016) 73 (Supplement) ICES Journal of Marine Science 44 at 45.  
27 J Collie et al, ‘Indirect Effects of Bottom Fishing on the Productivity of Marine Fish’ (2017) 18 Fish and 
Fisheries 619 at 634. 
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other industries to create further habitat fragmentation within sensitive marine ecosystems.28 
Self-evidently, the environmental risks posed by bottom trawling vary markedly based on the 
type of habitats affected and the regularity and intensity in which such activities are 
conducted. Accordingly, as observed below, legal responses to bottom trawling have focused 
upon identifying areas of particular environmental sensitivity within which fishing is to be 
largely precluded, alongside mapping the footprint of current fishing activities and restricting 
trawls to areas of pre-existing intensity and enforcing ‘move-on’ rules where protected 
ecosystems may become threatened.  
One immediate impediment to the uniform governance of these activities in ABNJ is 
that, although bottom trawling is widely practised and defined, there is as yet no universal 
understanding of the concept of the ‘deep sea.’ An initial review of bottom fishing in ABNJ 
by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) considered activities conducted at 
depths of 200 metres or more,29 a trend that has been followed by the UN Secretary-General 
in semi-regular reports reviewing the pertinent UNGA commitments, although subsequent 
FAO documentation has been less consistent.30 Furthermore, the practical implementation of 
these commitments has engendered an increasing number of regional and institutional 
variations. For instance, the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) applies 400 
metres as its regulatory threshold,31 yet, for the same waters, the European Union (EU) has 
identified instead a series of species that are targeted at advanced depths and has prohibited 
bottom fishing for these stocks beyond 800 metres.32 As noted below, the relevant UNGA 
resolutions have not adopted a formal depth threshold for bottom fisheries. Different regional 
governance bodies have accordingly applied varying criteria to address the specific needs of 
the marine ecosystems under their respective purviews.  
However it is defined by individual actors, deep-sea bottom fishing nonetheless 
remains ecologically problematic for two main reasons. First, larger and heavier equipment is 
required to facilitate effective fishing at advanced depths, so these activities are often far 
                                                          
28 Thrush, Ellingsen and Davis, supra note 26 at 45–6.  
29 Bensch, supra note 12 at 2.  
30 FAO documentation now seemingly considers depths of 500 metres to be the appropriate definition . GA 
Oanta, ‘International Organizations and Deep-Sea Fisheries: Current Status and Future Prospects’ (2018) 87 
Marine Policy 51 at 52. 
31 Ibid. 
32 EU Regulation no. 2016/2336 Establishing Specific Conditions for Fishing Deep-Sea Stocks in the North-East 
Atlantic and Provisions for Fishing in International Waters of the North-East Atlantic and repealing EC Council 
Regulation no. 2347/2002, [2016] OJ L354/1, arts 3(1), 8(4); see further GA Oanta, ‘The European Union’s 
Reform of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the North-East Atlantic’ (2017) 32 Intl J Marine & Coastal L 589 at 593–6. 
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more destructive than other techniques, including trawling undertaken in shallower waters.33 
This is compounded by a tendency for trawls to be conducted intensively in particular 
locations, notably around seamounts and other fragile submarine features, due to the habitual 
aggregation of fish in these areas.34 Moreover, the disturbance of the benthos at advanced 
depths poses a particularly significant threat to the integrity of deep-sea habitats.35 Indeed, 
while warming temperatures, acidification, and changes in ocean circulation have long been 
identified as the most pressing examples of adverse anthropogenic influence upon the marine 
environment, it has been advocated in influential quarters that the modification of submarine 
features by deep-water trawling ought to be considered an equally significant long-term 
global conservation threat to oceanic ecosystems.36  
The second key concern relates to the vulnerability of the target stocks themselves. In 
order to survive at advanced depths in an environment characterized by cold temperatures, 
little light, and limited productivity, fish typically exhibit delayed sexual maturity, slow 
growth, and a high maximum age. In marked contrast to fish exploited at shallower depths, 
deep-water species are acutely vulnerable to the impacts of fishing since, with very few 
exceptions, such stocks can become rapidly depleted with little scope to regenerate swiftly.37 
The risks of overfishing are compounded by a lack of baseline data concerning both deep-
water stocks and their accompanying ecosystems. Consequently , most deep-sea fisheries are 
considered unlikely to be either ecologically38 or economically39 sustainable in the long term. 
Accordingly, as Telmo Morato and colleagues observe, ‘deep-sea fisheries cannot be seen as 
a replacement for declining shallow-water resources: instead, deep-water habitats should be 
considered as the new candidates for conservation.’40 
From a governance standpoint, bottom trawling has raised particular objections when 
conducted in ABNJ since the yields of fish have been decidedly modest—certainly, when 
judged against their contribution towards meeting global nutritional needs—yet the damage 
sustained by the marine environment in the process has often been substantial. These 
                                                          
33 MR Clark et al, ‘The Impacts of Deep-Sea Fisheries on Benthic Communities: A Review’ (2016) 73  
(Supplement) ICES Journal of Marine Science 51 at 52. 
34 T Morato, WWL Cheung and TJ Pitcher, ‘Vulnerability of Seamount Fish to Fishing: Fuzzy Analysis of Life 
History Attributes’ (2006) 68 Journal of Fish Biology 209.  
35 A Pusceddu et al, ‘Chronic and Intensive Bottom Trawling Impairs Deep-Sea Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Functioning’ (2014) 111 PNAS 8861 at 8861.  
36 P Puig et al, ‘Ploughing the Deep Sea Floor’ (2012) 489 Nature 286 at 289. 
37 Morato, supra note 11 at 25. 
38 Norse, supra note 18 at 317. 
39 J Clarke et al, ‘A Scientific Basis for Regulating Deep-Sea Fishing by Depth’ (2015) 25 Current Biology 
2425. 
40 Morato, supra note 11 at 32. 
9 
 
concerns are amplified by the fact that such activities are pursued by relatively few states; 
hence, bottom fisheries inflict a dramatically disproportionate degree of harm upon the global 
commons relative to their numerical participants. The purported regulation of deep-sea 
ecosystems  has duly generated particular tensions between states and interest groups, which 
have been reflected in the development of the relevant UNGA commitments—an ongoing 
process to which this article now turns. 
 
III. THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF DEEP-SEA BOTTOM FISHERIES 
 
Until the present century, deep-sea bottom fisheries were subject to minimal legal oversight. 
By the late 1990s, deep-sea fishing on the high seas had become an increasingly lucrative 
enterprise, with species such as orange roughy and Antarctic toothfish having been 
‘discovered’ as a particularly popular form of seafood, precipitating a dramatic expansion in 
both officially sanctioned and illicit activities. Conversely, however, as concerns began to 
mount over the continued expansion of fishing activities into deeper areas of the global 
oceans, it also became readily apparent that the pursuit of deep-sea stocks exposed acute 
governance gaps in the international framework for the regulation of fisheries, especially 
within ABNJ.  
In this regard, three key deficiencies can be seen to have arisen at the material time. 
First, there were significant portions of the high seas for which RFMOs had yet to be 
established, therefore there were few pre-existing governance structures through which deep-
sea fisheries might be addressed, even assuming that the requisite regulatory will was 
forthcoming to do so. Second, within the network of regulatory coverage that did exist, only 
four such bodies were then endowed with powers to address deep-sea stocks, with many 
RFMOs having been created to regulate specific species, notably tuna or salmon.41 Third, 
compounding these regulatory lacunae, it was legally questionable among the small collective 
of actors with an explicit remit to govern deep-sea stocks whether this competence extended 
beyond the management of the target stock to also include consideration of the wider 
ecosystem impacts of such fisheries. Indeed, a strict interpretation of the mandates of these 
bodies at the time would suggest that only the Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) retained express powers to regulate both deep-sea 
                                                          
41 Namely, the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization (NAFO), the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), and the Commission 
for the Conservation of Atlantic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).  
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species and the ecosystem impacts of fishing upon them.42 Consequently, for most areas of 
the global oceans, deep-sea fisheries represented ‘one of the last unregulated open-access 
frontiers, governed only by the general provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.’43  
 
<H2>1. Deep-Sea Fisheries and UNCLOS 
 
Although UNCLOS prescribes overarching obligations to govern the pursuit of marine 
resources, this regime, by the turn of the twenty-first century, seemingly offered a limited 
degree of protection to deep-sea ecosystems in the face of proliferating fisheries. Such 
activities were not expressly considered in the negotiations at the third Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, from which the 1982 convention and its general framework for fisheries 
competences would ultimately emerge. Under UNCLOS, states enjoy extensive rights to 
utilize fisheries resources on the high seas44 and in their respective exclusive economic zones 
(EEZs),45 subject to broad obligations concerning the conservation of the stocks in question.46 
Within the EEZ, however, these obligations are primarily concerned with ensuring that fish 
stocks are managed in a way that consistently allows for harvesting at a maximum sustainable 
yield and that overfishing does not occur as a result, while also considering the inter-
dependence of fish stocks.47 Parallel requirements for the high seas are more circumspect, 
with states under the comparatively ambiguous obligation to exercise ‘due regard’,48 although 
this concept would infer a requirement to pursue deep-sea fisheries in a manner that would 
not compromise the interests of other states, such as inflicting significant harm upon stocks 
and fragile ecosystems in the process.  
Given that VMEs are primarily located in the vicinity of the seabed, the provisions of 
UNCLOS concerning the continental shelf are also relevant. A desire to address benthic 
fisheries in ABNJ was apparent in the genesis of the continental shelf regime, although 
attempts by some states to include demersal fish within the ambit of these provisions 
                                                          
42 EJ Molenaar, ‘Addressing Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries’ (2005) 20 Intl J Marine & Coastal L 533 
at 538. 
43 KM Gjerde and D Freestone, ‘Unfinished Business: Deep-Sea Fisheries and the Conservation of Marine 
Biodiversity beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2004) 19 Intl J Marine & Coastal L 209 at 209. 
44 UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts 87(1)(a), 116. 
45 Ibid, art 62. 
46 Ibid, arts 61 (exclusive economic zone [EEZ]), 117–19 (high seas). 
47 Ibid, art 61. 
48 Ibid, art 87(2). 
11 
 
ultimately failed.49 Instead, the prevailing regulatory motivation was to secure effective 
national control over lucrative shellfish resources rather than protecting these ecosystems per 
se.50 For benthic ecosystems that are (now) found within the limits of national jurisdiction, 
UNCLOS prescribes the conditions under which states may exercise sovereign rights over 
sedentary species located upon their continental shelves.51 Due to the commercial and 
technical challenges inherent in harvesting sedentary species at advanced depths, Article 77 
has been invoked relatively infrequently in a fisheries context, notwithstanding sporadic 
disputes as to whether particular species are fully ‘sedentary’ in nature52 and the prospective 
competence of RFMOs over such resources if they are not.53  
However, these provisions do not comprehensively address the position of deep-sea 
fisheries, which involve harvesting non-sedentary species in close proximity to the seabed as 
opposed to exploiting species that are widely considered to be a feature of the benthos itself. 
Limited controls were placed upon these activities in ABNJ by the earlier 1958 Convention 
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,54 whereby ‘fisheries 
conducted by means of equipment embedded in the floor of the sea in areas of the high seas 
adjacent to the territorial sea of a state’ could be regulated if they had been long maintained 
and conducted by nationals of that state, and any resulting legislation allowed third parties to 
participate on an equal basis.55 Under UNCLOS, sedentary species lie outside the scope of 
the EEZ regime and cannot be exploited without the express permission of the coastal state.56 
This position does allow for more stringent restrictions to be imposed on certain seabed 
                                                          
49 S Borg, Conservation on the High Seas: Harmonizing International Regimes for the Sustainable Use of 
Marine Resources (2012) at 151 (observing a minority viewpoint that demersal fisheries were more 
appropriately regulated under the aegis of the continental shelf, since the survival of the stocks is ‘intimately 
associated with the seabed’). 
50 J Mossop, The Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Rights and Responsibilities (2016) at 62. This 
engendered a special regime for sedentary species under the Convention on the Continental Shelf , 1958, 499 
UNTS 311; see R Young, ‘Sedentary Fisheries and the Convention on the Continental Shelf’ (1961) 55 AJIL 
359. 
51 UNCLOS, supra note 2, art 77(1). Sedentary species are defined in art 77(4) as ‘organisms which, at the 
harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical 
contact with the seabed or the subsoil.’  
52 Notably regarding crustaceans. Mossop, supra note 51 at 62–7.  
53 Eg, in January 2017, a District Court in Norway (erroneously) acquitted a Latvian vessel of unauthorized 
fishing for snow crabs on the Norwegian continental shelf on the basis that such stocks were governed by 
NEAFC, whereas Norway had not consented to the management of sedentary species by the Commission in 
these waters. I Dahl and E Johansen, The Norwegian Snow Crab Regime and Foreign Vessels: A Commentary 
on the Juras Vilkas Decision of the Øst-Finnmark District Court, available at 
<http://site.uit.no/jclos/2017/03/29/the-norwegian-snow-crab-regime-and-foreign-vessels-a-commentary-on-the-
juras-vilkas-decision-of-the-ost-finnmark-district-court/>. 
54 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 1958, 559 UNTS 285. 
55 Ibid, art 13(1). 
56 UNCLOS, supra note 2, art 77(2). 
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fishing activities should the national authorities so decree; as noted below, pertinent 
international guidelines57 and UNGA resolutions58 have emphasized respect for the 
sovereignty of the coastal state in these areas.  
However, there are clear limitations on the ability of a coastal state to restrict bottom 
fishing more holistically under the specific regime of the continental shelf, not least since 
‘[t]he rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the 
superjacent waters or of the air space above those waters.’59 Moreover, the exercise of these 
rights cannot ‘infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference’ with the rights and freedoms 
established under UNCLOS, which would include fishing.60 Nevertheless, when applied in 
tandem with the use of EEZ powers to facilitate fishery closures and/or the creation of marine 
protected areas (MPAs), particular coastal states have been prepared to close significant 
portions of the continental shelf within 200 nautical miles to bottom fisheries as part of a 
strong national stance against destructive fishing methods.61 These provisions are therefore 
not without considerable practical utility in the context of deep-sea ecosystems located within 
national waters.  
The continental shelf provisions under UNCLOS also raise an intriguing regulatory 
question over the conduct of high seas bottom fishing in those areas of the continental shelf 
that lie beyond 200 nautical miles and for which the coastal state has sought to exercise its 
right to claim an outer continental shelf under Article 76 of UNCLOS. This inevitably 
generates scope for tension between, on the one hand, the prospective intention of a coastal 
state to implement provisions for the protection of seabed ecosystems in these areas and, on 
the other hand, the long-established rights to fish on the high seas under Article 87(2). As a 
general principle, Part VI of UNCLOS, which addresses the continental shelf, is guided by 
the entrenchment of the sovereign rights of coastal states over specific resources. As Joanna 
Mossop observes, there may be a narrow foundation to ‘restrict the activities of other states, 
such as bottom trawling, if it is reasonably connected with the exploration and exploitation of 
                                                          
57 International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the High Seas (2008), para 25 (Deep-
Sea Fishing Guidelines). 
58 UNGA Resolution 71/123 (7 December 2016), paras 176, 177. 
59 UNCLOS, supra note 2, art 78(1). 
60 Ibid, art 78(2). 
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sedentary species.’62 The opportunity to curtail bottom fishing would therefore appear to be 
limited, given that Article 77 is effectively silent on the conservation and management of the 
continental shelf.  
Similarly, the unilateral declaration of a MPA in these areas for such purposes, and 
concurrent restrictions on high seas fishing, may be less readily accepted and observed by 
other states in the absence of some further layer of regulatory legitimacy, such as the support 
of an influential multilateral body. The limited degree of current practice suggests that states 
are receptive to national attempts to protect marine features on the outer continental shelf 
under particular circumstances, as illustrated by the assertion of Portuguese sovereignty over 
the ‘Rainbow’, a large hydrothermal vent ecosystem discovered off the coast of the Azores in 
what had then constituted ABNJ. In 2005, a proposal was under development to establish the 
‘Rainbow’ as a MPA under the auspices of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), when Portugal coincidentally 
sought to assert jurisdiction over the area as part of its prospective outer continental shelf.63 
Shortly afterwards, Portugal proposed the area to the OSPAR Commission as a MPA in its 
individual capacity, a process that was endorsed by the other parties in what has been 
interpreted as a pioneering legal recognition of the environmental jurisdiction of the coastal 
state over these areas prior to a formal recommendation by the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS), even if Portuguese control over these features was conditional 
at best.64 The ‘Rainbow’ arrangements may ultimately be viewed in their own unique 
circumstances, given that there was widespread support within the region for their protection, 
while fisheries considerations were largely absent from this decision. However, future 
declarations of this nature could generate significant friction if exercised with respect to the 
seabed below an important high seas fishing area and in the context of a more ambivalent 
view of the coastal state’s appreciation for particular submarine features. 
Conversely, the reverence for coastal state sovereignty over the continental shelf may 
have implications for seabed features in ABNJ that have been previously protected as the 
CLCS duly returns its recommendations as to the entitlements of states to extended territory 
in particular regions, thereby potentially repatriating some of these areas to national 
                                                          
62 J Mossop, ‘The Relationship between the Continental Shelf Regime and a New International Instrument for 
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63 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 1992, 2354 UNTS 67 
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jurisdiction.65 This raises the theoretical possibility that a seabed feature that was protected by 
a multilateral regulator while this area lay beyond national jurisdiction might be divested of 
this status when returned to national control. It remains to be seen how such areas will 
eventually be treated under these circumstances since national law would technically 
supersede these prior arrangements.66 As observed below, given that a broad duty to protect 
the marine environment is prescribed under UNCLOS, which would also apply to Article 77, 
while the various UNGA resolutions also call upon states to protect VMEs in their individual 
capacity, it is nevertheless tenable to suggest that the prior status of these features should not 
be without consequence in any transition to national control, especially where the coastal 
state in question has endorsed the initial protective designation.  
While the UNCLOS provisions concerning EEZs, continental shelves, and high seas 
address the broad entitlements of states over the pursuit of natural resources, they do not 
consider the wider environmental ramifications of such activities. VMEs are instead 
technically caught within Part XII, which addresses the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, wherein Articles 192 and 194(5) of UNCLOS provide ‘a rudimentary 
framework for the control of fishing methods.’67 Article 192 concisely stipulates that ‘[s]tates 
have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.’ Despite the simplicity of 
this formulation, Article 192 holds considerable significance as a guiding principle for the 
regulation of fisheries. Indeed, it has been expressly confirmed in a fisheries context that ‘the 
conservation of the living resources of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment’68 and that this obligation unequivocally applies to ‘all maritime 
areas, including those encompassed by exclusive economic zones.’69 Moreover, it has been 
recently expounded that Article 192 ‘extends to the prevention of harms that would affect 
depleted, threatened, or endangered species indirectly through the destruction of their 
habitat,’ which would further clarify the value of this provision as a regulatory platform for 
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the protection of deep-sea ecosystems.70 The implications of this provision are therefore 
considerable since it imposes an obligation of due diligence upon states to ensure that 
nationally registered vessels adhere to relevant conservation and management measures 
during the conduct of fishing activities.71 
Likewise, Article 194 concerns ‘measures to prevent, control and reduce pollution of 
the marine environment.’ Nevertheless, it has recently been confirmed that the scope of this 
provision should be interpreted more broadly than its titular intent would immediately 
suggest, since Article 194 is ‘not limited to measures aimed strictly at controlling marine 
pollution.’72 This is important from the standpoint of VMEs as Article 194(5) provides that 
measures undertaken pursuant to Part XII ‘shall include those necessary to protect and 
preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or 
endangered species and other forms of marine life.’ Moreover, it has been asserted that the 
general obligation to protect the marine environment advanced in Article 192 is ‘given 
particular shape in the context of fragile ecosystems by Article 194(5).’73 Accordingly, if a 
state is deemed to have knowledge that its vessels are conducting destructive fishing 
activities, a failure to enforce such measures may constitute a breach of the obligation of due 
diligence, as was determined in the context of damage wrought to fragile coral ecosystems by 
Chinese vessels in contested areas of the South China Sea.74  
Recent decisions by international courts and tribunals have therefore established the 
protection of fragile benthic features as a significant component of the obligations incumbent 
in Part XII of UNCLOS. Nevertheless, in returning to the regulatory position of the early 
twenty-first century, it was by no means axiomatic that such a robust interpretation of these 
obligations applied in the context of the deep sea, and strong doubts were expressed over the 
adequacy of the international legal framework to facilitate the effective protection of seabed 
ecosystems from proliferating fisheries.75 Indeed, it may be speculated that the strong 
statements recently expressed by a number of courts and tribunals concerning the 
interpretation of Articles 192 and 194 in the context of fisheries may have been informed, to 
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at least some degree, by the expanding cohort of commitments towards VMEs developed in 
the decade preceding this litigation. 
The general regulatory framework for fisheries advanced under UNCLOS has been 
buttressed by the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA).76 While the UNFSA 
applies expressly to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, it has nonetheless provided a 
rich source of inspiration for the further development of the governance regime for fisheries. 
More specifically, as explored in fourth section of this article, it has facilitated the 
establishment of an increased number of far-sighted RFMOs, thereby promoting the closure 
of a number of previous governance gaps and ensuring that these institutions are imbued with 
an enhanced environmental mandate. In the context of VMEs, three particular features of the 
UNFSA have transpired to be of considerable value. First, Article 5(g) promotes the need to 
‘protect biodiversity in the marine environment’ as a general principle for the application of 
the agreement, establishing ecosystem considerations as a more central element of the 
consideration of post-UNFSA RFMOs than had previously been the case. Just as 
significantly, however, a degree of ‘retro-fitting’ of these commitments has also been 
apparent in the mandates of some of the pre-UNFSA RFMOs, thus establishing 
environmental considerations more centrally within the work of these bodies, which has 
promoted a greater focus upon deep-sea ecosystems. Second, and allied to this, under Article 
7(5), parties are required ‘in a spirit of understanding and cooperation [to] make every effort 
to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature.’ Consequently, as observed in the 
fourth section of this article, a number of provisional arrangements pending the creation of a 
formal RFMO have facilitated the interim development of conservation measures to 
specifically protect deep-sea ecosystems.  
Third, and perhaps most significantly, Article 6 mandates the application of the 
precautionary approach to fisheries, including an obligation for states to proceed with greater 
caution ‘where information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate.’77 Moreover, Article 6(6) 
of the UNFSA expressly contemplates the application of specific governance principles 
where a ‘new’ or ‘exploratory’ fishery is to be established. Accordingly, where fisheries 
operations are to prospectively expand into new areas or depths, or to address previously 
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unfished species, the UNFSA requires the application of cautious conservation measures to 
facilitate the acquisition of sufficient catch data to assess the impacts of fishing on the long-
term sustainability of the stocks. Thereafter, if appropriate, conservation and management 
measures may be adopted to allow for the gradual development of the fishery and its eventual 
transition to commercial management. While the regime of new and exploratory fisheries 
continues to generate threshold questions and uncertainty as to how such measures are to be 
applied, a number of RFMOs have expressly developed a precautionary position on 
exploratory bottom fisheries that stems from the influence of UNGA commitments, which 
may be increasingly considered to represent the minimum standards for such activities in the 
deep-sea environment.78 In addition to these influences, the periodic review conferences of 
the UNFSA have also provided a prominent platform for the further political endorsement of 
standards to protect deep-sea ecosystems,79 notwithstanding a minority viewpoint among the 
parties that such endeavours are best promoted under the aegis of the UNGA itself.80  
 
<H2>2. The Emergence and Evolution of UNGA Commitments 
 
By the early 2000s, it was increasingly clear that the general framework of UNCLOS had not 
facilitated the tailored regulatory strategies necessary for the effective protection of deep-sea 
ecosystems. In addition to the governance gaps exposed by the complications surrounding 
RFMO competences over the deep-sea itself, significant challenges were also evident in 
identifying an effective forum through which such standards might ultimately be developed. 
As concerns mounted over the further proliferation of bottom fisheries, strong divergences of 
opinion arose over whether deep-sea fishing would be more appropriately addressed through 
binding or non-binding means.81 Moreover, it was not initially apparent which international 
platform would be most politically receptive to calls for the improved governance of these 
activities, nor which institution would be best placed to introduce regulatory standards if 
global opinion could ultimately be mobilized in this direction.  
                                                          
78 R Caddell, ‘Precautionary Management and the Development of Future Fishing Opportunities: The 
International Regulation of New and Exploratory Fisheries (2018) 33 Intl J Marine & Coastal L 199 at 248–59. 
79 Report of the Resumed Review Conference of the UNFSA 2010, Doc A/CONF.210/2010/7 (2010), para 57; 
Report of the Resumed Review Conference of UNFSA 2016 , Doc A/CONF.210.2016/5 (2016), para 84. 
80 Report of the Resumed Review Conference of the UNFSA 2006 , Doc A/CONF.210/20016/15 (2016), paras 29, 
56.  
81 See DA Balton and DC Zbicz, ‘Managing Deep-Sea Fisheries: Some Threshold Questions’ (2004) 19 Intl J 
Marine & Coastal L 247 at 252–5. 
18 
 
In this regard, since the early 1990s, the UNGA has represented a somewhat 
unheralded, yet expedient and influential, forum for the elaboration of governance objectives 
for ABNJ. Notably, the UNGA offers the advantage of providing the legitimacy of a suitably 
global platform for such discussions, while also effectively skirting the vexed question of 
whether the resulting provisions should be binding and thereby trigger more substantive 
consequences if they are not fully implemented. Aside from internal organizational matters, 
the eclectic and extensive resolutions adopted annually by the UNGA do not have binding 
effect. Nevertheless, this does not divest them of broader regulatory significance. Indeed, 
they evidently have an intriguing role to play in the development of international standards to 
address certain problematic issues affecting the global commons, not least in the context of 
fisheries and ABNJ. One manifestation of their practical value is as a means of identifying 
and articulating desirable objectives, which in turn may catalyze further governance 
developments. Thus, as James Harrison observes, such instruments may not themselves 
constitute law-making tools, but they have instead exerted a more nuanced influence on state 
practice by ‘drawing attention to the current threats to fish stocks and encouraging 
international efforts taking place in other institutions to address them.’82  
Moreover, the annual UNGA resolutions addressing the law of the sea provide an 
opportunity to contemplate particular issues that were not foreseen at the time of the 
negotiations at the third Conference on the Law of the Sea.83 Accordingly, they may be 
considered to represent an important tool to facilitate the progressive development of a treaty 
that was always intended to mature organically to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Alternatively, Kristina Gjerde interprets the attention given by the UNGA to bottom fishing 
and other environmental dilemmas within ABNJ as a failure of IEG, representing a disturbing 
trend whereby the inability of UNCLOS to address depleted fisheries and ecosystem concerns 
effectively has increasingly displaced the necessary discussion of these pressing issues into 
other globalized fora.84 
Nevertheless, UNGA resolutions have proved valuable in addressing destructive 
fishing practices. An intriguing precedent was set in the early 1990s concerning large-scale 
driftnet fishing on the high seas, whereby UNGA resolutions provided a compelling stimulus 
for subsequent regulatory activity by RFMOs, states, and other actors. Due to their propensity 
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to take large numbers of juvenile fish and non-target species as by-catches, modern driftnets 
are highly controversial.85 By 1992, drawing on preceding regional initiatives,86 a series of 
pioneering UNGA resolutions had been adopted to progressively limit the use of driftnets, 
culminating in a moratorium on all such nets above 2.5 kilometres in length on the high 
seas.87 These restrictions were rapidly accepted by the vast majority of states—including 
those that had resolutely opposed the resolutions88 and non-members of the UN89—as well 
RFMOs and other pertinent multilateral actors, leading to the strong argument that this 
position now represents customary international law,90 notwithstanding some misgivings over 
the suitability of the UNGA as a forum for the development of technical fisheries standards.91 
The UNGA driftnet resolutions nonetheless provided a helpful regulatory template 
with which to address the growing international concerns over deep-sea bottom fishing. From 
approximately 2000 onwards, these concerns initially manifested themselves in a rather 
ambiguous recognition of the pernicious impacts of under-regulated fishing upon marine 
ecosystems, as a series of bodies expressed the need for some form of action to be taken, 
albeit without identifying under whose auspices this ought to occur.92 Indeed, this generated a 
plethora of statements from a host of institutions, largely nominating each other to ascertain 
the scale of the problem and facilitate a regulatory solution. The rather circular result, as one 
contemporaneous account wryly surmised, was ‘an increasingly long-winded and complex 
series of decisions and resolutions, [whereby] each of these bodies has done little except to 
call upon other bodies to take action, without necessarily specifying very clearly what that 
action might be.’93  
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The UNGA was not immune to these criticisms, observing in 2002 the need for 
‘relevant international organizations … to consider urgently ways to integrate and improve, 
on a scientific basis, the management of risks to marine biodiversity of seamounts and certain 
other underwater features within the framework of [UNCLOS].’94 A more specific basis for 
regulatory activity, however, would soon be forthcoming. In early 2004, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) convened its seventh Conference of the Parties,95 adopting a 
resolution that echoed the sentiments of the previous UNGA resolutions as to the plight of 
marine biodiversity in ABNJ and the need to establish protected areas to conserve 
‘seamounts, hydrothermal vents, cold-water corals, and other vulnerable ecosystems.’96 The 
parties to the CBD thus acknowledged that ‘the law of the sea provides a legal framework for 
regulating activities in marine areas beyond national jurisdiction’97 and appealed for 
widespread international support for the UNGA in identifying appropriate mechanisms to 
establish MPAs for these submarine features and ecosystems. Shortly afterwards, an 
influential collective of non-governmental organizations lobbied the UN Open-Ended 
Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea—an increasingly important stage in 
the process through which the UNGA develops its regulatory position on marine affairs—for 
a moratorium on high seas bottom trawling. Later that year, having been identified as the 
most suitable forum for further policy direction, the UNGA duly adopted its first major 
resolution addressing elements of the deep-sea environment.98 
To this end, in four core paragraphs, Resolution 59/25 laments a general lack of 
regulatory competence for the regulation of particular marine ecosystems and requests a 
variety of actors to seek to rectify these governance challenges as a matter of priority. Most 
notably, paragraph 66 of Resolution 59/25 calls upon states, 
 
<Q>either by themselves or through regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements, 
where these are competent to do so, to take action urgently, and consider on a case-by-case basis and 
on a scientific basis, including the application of the precautionary approach, the interim prohibition 
of destructive fishing practices, including bottom trawling that has adverse impacts on vulnerable 
marine ecosystems, including seamounts, hydrothermal vents and cold water corals located beyond 
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national jurisdiction, until such time as appropriate conservation and management measures have been 
adopted in accordance with international law.<Q> 
 
The phrasing of paragraph 66 is significant. It represents an inaugural (and undefined) use of 
the term ‘vulnerable marine ecosystem,’ which has subsequently become a ubiquitous 
addition to the lexicon of marine governance. The commitment to seek the interim 
prohibition of destructive practices on a case-by-case basis nonetheless falls considerably 
short of the moratorium on deep-sea fishing in its entirety that had been sought in particular 
quarters and had indeed been initially endorsed in earlier drafts of the resolution with regard 
to ABNJ.99 Moreover, the appeal for further action can be construed broadly and is not 
restricted to bottom trawling, even if this is, in practice, the most pressing fisheries-related 
threat to the categories of ecosystems identified within the text. Likewise, the paragraph is 
drafted in a manner that suggests that such actions are not mandated solely for ABNJ. A more 
extensive interpretation of the suite of activities caught within the purview of the resolution is 
therefore appropriate, both substantively and geographically. Accordingly, while the 
regulation of high seas bottom trawling is undoubtedly the core aim of Resolution 59/25, 
these provisions are ultimately directed at destructive fishing practices generally and may be 
construed as addressing particular marine features that are present both within and beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction. 
Buttressing these recommendations, Resolution 59/25 calls upon those RFMOs with 
competence over bottom fisheries to ‘urgently’ adopt conservation and management 
measures in accordance with international law to address destructive fishing practices, 
including bottom fishing that has adverse impacts on VMEs, and to ensure compliance with 
such measures. Prospectively, the members of RFMOs that lacked these competences at the 
time were requested to extend these pre-existing mandates to regulate bottom fisheries,100 
while the international community was urged to cooperate in the creation of new RFMOs for 
unregulated areas of the global oceans, which would be endowed with these powers ab initio 
and, thereby, be able to address deep-sea fishing as an immediate priority upon their 
inception. 
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Two years later, an arguably more influential resolution was adopted by the UNGA, 
expressing dissatisfaction with the rate of progress since 2004 and calling for steps to be 
taken ‘immediately’ to sustainably manage deep-sea fish stocks and VMEs.101 Significantly, 
paragraph 83 of Resolution 61/105 listed for the first time a series of targeted action points 
for RFMOs to complete before a deadline of 31 December 2008, namely: 
 
<Q>(a) To assess, on the basis of the best available scientific information, whether individual bottom 
fishing activities would have significant adverse impacts on vulnerable marine ecosystems, and to 
ensure that if it is assessed that these activities would have significant adverse impacts, they are 
managed to prevent such impacts, or not authorized to proceed; 
(b) To identify vulnerable marine ecosystems and determine whether bottom fishing activities would 
cause significant adverse impacts to such ecosystems and the long-term sustainability of deep sea fish 
stocks, inter alia, by improving scientific research and data collection and sharing, and through new 
and exploratory fisheries; 
(c) In respect of areas where vulnerable marine ecosystems, including seamounts, hydrothermal vents 
and cold water corals, are known to occur or are likely to occur based on the best available scientific 
information, to close such areas to bottom fishing and ensure that such activities do not proceed unless 
conservation and management measures have been established to prevent significant adverse impacts 
on vulnerable marine ecosystems; 
(d) To require members of the regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements to 
require vessels flying their flag to cease bottom fishing activities in areas where, in the course of 
fishing operations, vulnerable marine ecosystems are encountered, and to report the encounter so that 
appropriate measures can be adopted in respect of the relevant site.<Q> 
 
Resolution 61/105 therefore represents a more nuanced series of restrictions upon bottom 
fisheries, whereby such commitments are triggered only where there is a threat of a 
significant adverse impact on VMEs. The regulatory onus is placed upon identifying 
locations within which VMEs are present and in establishing a precautionary requirement for 
vessels to cease fishing upon encountering such features or pre-emptively closing these areas 
to bottom fishing until it may be established that no such encounters are likely to result from 
either commercial or exploratory fishing activities. In principle, this allows for the co-
existence of fisheries and environmental restrictions in locations that are identified as 
susceptible to the adverse impacts of deep-sea bottom fishing if not managed proactively.  
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Nevertheless, Resolution 61/105 raised immediate interpretive difficulties since the 
thresholds by which a marine ecosystem may be considered ‘vulnerable’ and an adverse 
impact deemed ‘significant’—and, indeed, the circumstances under which an ‘encounter’ 
may be considered to have occurred in the first place—were not defined further; hence, the 
FAO was called upon to elaborate detailed practical guidance on these issues.102 Resolution 
61/105 also recommended the expedited development of interim measures to address 
locations without operational RFMO coverage103 and, for the first time, directed specific 
action points to states in areas for which no competent authority was in existence, requesting 
flag states to cease the authorization of fishing vessels in ABNJ without a competent RFMO 
or to unilaterally introduce measures applicable to nationally registered ships to implement 
the broad commitments advanced therein.104 
In 2008, following an extensive technical consultation process, the FAO adopted its 
International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the High Seas (Deep-
Sea Fishing Guidelines) to frame the practical implementation of the relevant UNGA 
resolutions for fisheries exploiting deep-sea species ‘in a targeted or incidental manner.’105 
The guidelines expressly apply to ABNJ—although states are also encouraged to adopt these 
approaches where appropriate within their national waters—and involve fisheries for which 
the total catch includes species that can only sustain low exploitation rates and where the 
fishing gear used in this process is likely to contact the sea floor during the course of fishing 
operations.106 The guidelines therefore seek to ensure the long-term and sustainable use of 
marine living resources in the deep sea and to prevent significant adverse impacts upon 
VMEs in the process.107 To this end, states and RFMOs are requested to adopt and implement 
measures consistent with the precautionary and ecosystem approaches to fisheries 
management, and in conformity with UNCLOS and other pertinent rules of international law, 
to identify areas in which VMEs are known or likely to occur and to take action using the 
best available information.108 
The guidelines were swiftly endorsed by the UNGA, which called upon states to 
secure their implementation ‘immediately, individually and through regional fisheries 
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management organizations and arrangements.’109 Nevertheless, it was observed that the 
operative paragraphs of the previous UNGA resolutions had not been ‘sufficiently 
implemented in all cases.’110 Accordingly, Resolution 64/72 reiterated the action points called 
for in Resolution 61/105, adding a further commitment to promote the adoption of 
conservation and management measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of deep-sea 
stocks and associated species, particularly by setting appropriate levels for fishing effort, 
capacity, and catch limits.111 This was reinforced in 2011, wherein the UNGA observed that 
‘despite the progress made, the urgent actions called for in the relevant paragraphs of 
resolutions 61/105 and 64/72 have not been fully implemented in all cases.’112 In a notable 
departure to the previous instruments, Resolution 66/68 further called for the strengthening of 
assessment procedures so as ‘to take into account individual, collective and cumulative 
impacts, and for making the assessments publicly available, recognizing that doing so can 
support transparency and capacity-building globally.’113  
Accordingly, an evolving suite of priority activities has been established across a 
series of UNGA resolutions, which have been implemented with varying degrees of priority 
and consistency by the collective of RFMOs exercising competence over deep-sea fisheries, 
alongside a degree of unilateral activity by particular states and entities to address bottom 
fishing activities conducted in ABNJ. 
 
<H1>IV. IMPLEMENTING AND ADVANCING THE UNGA VME RESOLUTIONS 
 
Since the first bottom-fishing restrictions were contemplated in UNGA Resolution 59/25, 
eight fisheries management bodies have established competence over deep-sea fisheries, each 
of which has developed policies to at least some extent to address these activities. These 
bodies encompass the NEAFC, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), the 
Southeast Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO), the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries 
Agreement (SIOFA), the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC), the General Fisheries 
Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), the South Pacific Regional Fisheries 
Management Organization (SPRFMO), and CCAMLR. This cohort is further complemented 
by the EU, which is not a RFMO but exercises extensive fisheries powers and has acted 
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unilaterally to promote standards for bottom fishing in ABNJ inspired by these UNGA 
commitments.  
Despite an expanding degree of regulation for deep-sea bottom fisheries in ABNJ, the 
work of these bodies rather defies neat comparative analysis. Each RFMO presides over a 
unique set of ecological conditions (and, thereby, differing volumes of VMEs to manage), 
different fishing industries, and varying political, material, and financial resources and 
priorities. Moreover, the constituent treaties of each of these bodies are also different, thereby 
conferring differing mandates upon them. Some have been established in the past decade and 
have thus been guided by modern marine conservation influences, notably the UNFSA and, 
indeed, the regulatory commitments of the UNGA resolutions. Others represent older 
structures and, in one notable case, have required extensive ‘retro-fitting’ in order to promote 
an ambitious and proactive stance towards VMEs. Accordingly, in reviewing the 
implementation of the UNGA commitments, it is perhaps more appropriate to identify core 
trends, mutual deficiencies, and innovative practices, given the absence of a unified set of 
natural and regulatory conditions between these regimes. The following section thus 
examines progress towards advancing what may be considered the core cumulative 
requirements of the UNGA resolutions, namely, the need to identify VMEs and to regulate 
fishing effort accordingly; closing governance gaps within ABNJ whereby VMEs may be 
affected by fishing activities; and the closure of areas of particular ecological sensitivity to 
deep-sea bottom fishing.  
 
<H2>1. Mapping VMEs and Managing Encounters 
 
A prominent commitment established across the suite of UNGA resolutions is the need to 
identify VMEs and to institute precautionary management measures to protect them from 
significant adverse impacts of bottom fishing. Nevertheless, as observed above, the ambitious 
objectives promoted within the resolutions have not been accompanied by clear articulations 
of key concepts. Accordingly, considerable importance was vested in the elaboration of the 
Deep-Sea Fishing Guidelines to provide practical guidance for RFMOs in framing 
conservation and management measures towards VMEs within their respective areas of 
activity. To this end, the guidelines describe vulnerability as being 
 
<Q>related to the likelihood that a population, community, or habitat will experience substantial 
alteration from short-term or chronic disturbance, and the likelihood that it would recover and in what 
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time frame. These are, in turn, related to the characteristics of the ecosystems themselves, especially 
biological and structural aspects. VME features may be physically or functionally fragile. The most 
vulnerable ecosystems are those that are both easily disturbed and very slow to recover, or may never 
recover.114<Q> 
 
Moreover, the guidelines observe that this is a relative concept; hence, features that are 
‘physically fragile or inherently rare’ may be vulnerable to most impacts, while other 
populations, communities, or habitats may be more resilient and therefore not necessarily 
‘vulnerable’ in particular contexts.115 This position reflects the earlier rejection of a proposed 
blanket ban on bottom trawling, with a number of states having reiterated concerns that such 
fisheries do not automatically provoke catastrophic impacts upon marine ecosystems and also 
represent a significant source of global food security.116 In this regard, the guidelines note 
that the risks to a marine ecosystem are measured ‘by its vulnerability, the probability of a 
threat occurring and the mitigation means applied to the threat.’117 
The Deep-Sea Fishing Guidelines also elaborate a series of representative 
characteristics that should be used as criteria in identifying VMEs—namely, the uniqueness 
or rarity of an area or ecosystem; the functional significance of the habitat; the fragility of the 
area; the life history traits of component species that would make recovery difficult (as 
exhibited in many species of deep-sea fish); and the structural complexity of an ecosystem.118 
Although a further, non-exhaustive, series of examples are listed in an annex to the 
guidelines, the individual geological conditions of each region mean that the ultimate 
decision as to whether a particular site or ecosystem constitutes a VME is made by the 
RFMO in question. Accordingly, the practice of RFMOs has been to develop extensive 
individual lists of indicator species and ecosystems.  
Arriving at a definitive judgment as to the existence of a VME is nevertheless a 
highly complex task and one that will be subject to constant revision in light of ongoing data-
collection requirements. It is also fraught with uncertainty, given the exceptionally limited 
baseline knowledge of the myriad complexities in interactions between features and species 
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that constitute and populate particular marine areas. The capacity of parties to RFMOs to 
constantly monitor such ecosystems—even within areas in which significant research 
activities have been conducted, let alone those that are currently unfished and largely 
unexplored—is highly variable, while assessing whether such areas might be sufficiently 
resilient to prospectively support fishing activities is also a complicated undertaking. 
Consequently, fishing in such areas exemplifies precisely the type of situation wherein the 
precautionary approach to fisheries management ought to be taken, which has prompted calls 
for institutional restraint and continued demands for a moratorium on such activities in 
ABNJ.119 
The identification of VMEs by individual RFMOs provides scope for sharing 
examples of best practice between RFMOs, as mandated both by successive UNGA 
resolutions and, indeed, the Deep-Sea Fishing Guidelines themselves.120 Nevertheless, this 
initially proved problematic, with concerns having been expressed that support tools were 
initially limited,121 with few opportunities for institutional learning between RFMOs.122 This 
has subsequently improved markedly, particularly through the development of a VME 
database maintained by the FAO, which allows for a further degree of cross-reference and 
comparison. Nevertheless, opportunities for the eight RFMOs that are competent to address 
deep-sea fishing to actively meet and evaluate best practices—reminiscent of the 
collaboration between the group of RFMOs that regulate single species123—appear distinctly 
limited, with incompatible meeting schedules and other operational priorities having stymied 
attempts to facilitate further institutional interactions.124 
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Where VMEs have been identified, the Deep-Sea Fishing Guidelines also tentatively 
outline the context in which a significant adverse impact is deemed to have occurred. Such an 
encounter is one in which ecosystem integrity is compromised in a manner that ‘(i) impairs 
the ability of affected populations to replace themselves; (ii) degrades the long-term natural 
productivity of habitats; or (iii) causes, on more than a temporary basis, significant loss of 
species richness, habitat or community types. Impacts should be evaluated individually, in 
combination and cumulatively.’125 The risk of a significant adverse impact therefore triggers 
further mitigation strategies, primarily in the form of the ‘move-on’ rule, which requires a 
vessel to retreat to a particular distance away from the VME in question. To this end, a 
number of RFMOs have developed encounter protocols, which are predominantly based upon 
the incidental catch of indicator species above threshold levels.126  
Nevertheless, concerns have been raised that the thresholds established by some 
RFMOs are contingent upon a particular volume of live by-catch. For instance, this has been 
the approach of NAFO, NEAFC, and SEAFO, although it is considered a poor tool to identify 
an encounter since the equipment used is designed exclusively to catch fish and is therefore 
not conducive to the effective sampling of benthic areas.127 Similarly, given that cold water 
reefs (which represent a substantial proportion of current VMEs) habitually comprise a 
framework of primarily dead coral, significant damage may be legitimately inflicted upon a 
VME without triggering the ‘move-on rule.’128 There is also a risk that evidence of an 
encounter may be lost during the retrieval of a net, leaving otherwise responsible fishers 
oblivious to an impact, while a long-standing objection to ‘move-on’ approaches remains the 
tacit toleration of a documented degree of environmental harm incumbent in the process.  
 
<H2>2. Closing Gaps in Regulatory Coverage 
 
A further issue of strong concern within the UNGA resolutions is the need to close the 
significant governance gaps that were exposed by initial attempts to regulate deep-sea 
fisheries. Despite a significant array of RFMOs currently in existence, fisheries often remain 
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deceptively under-regulated on an international basis. Many such bodies apply only to single 
species, while, until relatively recently, large portions of ABNJ were not subject to any 
RFMO coverage. Moreover, as observed above, those RFMOs that did technically exercise a 
mandate over deep-sea stocks generally lacked the legal competence to fully protect VMEs 
under this purview. In this respect, closing gaps in regulatory coverage, which can objectively 
be viewed as one of the more successful elements of the implementation of the various 
UNGA commitments, has been facilitated in three main ways.  
First, a suite of new RFMOs—notably SIOFA, SEAFO, the SPRFMO, and the 
NPFC—were inaugurated subsequent to the adoption of the initial UNGA resolutions on 
sustainable fisheries. Moreover, the creation of these bodies was primarily influenced by the 
stronger conservation mandate promoted by the UNFSA, which formally entered into effect 
in 2001, which has coloured their focus and remit accordingly. Indeed, some of the most 
recently inaugurated RFMOs have explicitly established the protection of VMEs as a central 
tenet of their mandates. This is most clearly illustrated by the NPFC, for which the preamble 
to its constituent treaty expressly references the relevant UNGA resolutions, while the 
prevention of significant adverse impacts from fisheries upon VMEs is established as a 
‘general principle’ for this body.129 Similarly, consideration of VMEs is centrally established 
in the mandate of the scientific institutions of the SPRFMO.130 More significantly, perhaps, 
the conclusion of these instruments was preceded by a series of interim arrangements focused 
on the regulation of bottom fishing in these areas. 
Second, the RFMOs have been prepared to interpret their mandates—and, indeed, 
reformulate their constituent provisions—to establish a clear degree of management control 
over such fisheries. This is exemplified by NEAFC, which closed three deep-sea sites to 
bottom trawling and fishing with static gear, including gillnets and bottom long-lines 
effective from 2005 onwards.131 This was a far-sighted development at the material time, 
preceding the seminal UNGA Resolution 59/25 by some months, with NEAFC therefore 
operating in uncharted waters with no global guidance in place. Moreover, it might be 
questioned whether, stricto sensu, NEAFC possessed the requisite regulatory competence to 
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do so, which required a very broad interpretation of the commission’s powers on the part of 
its constituent members in approving these closures.132 
More fundamentally, older structures have undertaken a process of considerable 
reform in recent years to allow them to more centrally address the environmental issues 
associated with deep-sea fisheries. In this respect, a series of provisions have been ‘retro-
fitted’ into the Convention on Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, through 
extensive textual revisions adopted in 2007 to promote an ecosystem approach to fisheries 
management, which eventually entered into effect on 18 May 2017.133 Notwithstanding the 
recent formalization of these arrangements, many of these obligations had been applied 
provisionally throughout this interim period,134 which enabled NAFO to adopt a series of 
measures to promote the protection of VMEs.  
Individual RFMOs have also interpreted particular fishing practices in a more 
expansive fashion, although this remains very much the exception rather than the rule. A 
striking example is the approach adopted by the SPRFMO, which has defined bottom 
trawling as including mid-water trawling on seamounts, given the propensity for contact with 
seabed features even at this comparatively more elevated depth.135 This remains a minority 
view, however, although similar policies were considered by NAFO in 2015, which failed to 
find consensus on the issue but, instead, imposed restrictions on the design and deployment 
of mid-water trawl gear.136  
Third, states and entities have been prepared to undertake unilateral action in order to 
address locations in which no RFMO is currently operational. A particular example is the 
southwest Atlantic, whereby political complications preclude the likely establishment of a 
RFMO for these waters for the foreseeable future. Deep-sea fishing has been conducted in the 
region, predominantly by Spain, for which a series of voluntary closures have been instituted. 
In 2008, in seeking to implement the UNGA resolutions, the EU adopted a regulation 
specifically addressing the actions of its member states in ABNJ for which no RFMO has 
been established or interim measures have not yet been agreed for the protection of VMEs.137 
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Under this provision, such activities may only be conducted pursuant to a special permit,138 
and the use of bottom gear is prohibited in areas ‘where no proper scientific assessment has 
been carried out and made available.’139 A permit may only be issued upon submission of a 
detailed fishing plan involving an assessment of the potential impacts of fishing in the area,140 
for which any breach is considered a ‘serious infringement’ of the Common Fisheries 
Policy.141 In response, Spain has thus far closed nine separate areas to deep-sea bottom 
fishing by its vessels. In 2017, a further regulation entered into force banning deep-sea 
fishing by EU vessels in the northeast Atlantic at depths of 800 metres, although the 
unilateral policies introduced by the EU for this region has generated some disquiet that such 
measures might exercise an undue influence over the future trajectory of the VME regulation 
within NEAFC.142 
 
<H2>3. Area-Based Management  
 
Allied to the need to identify areas within which VMEs may be present and to advance 
appropriate encounter protocols and mitigation strategies, a key commitment established 
within the multiple UNGA resolutions is to prevent fishing activities where they may have a 
significant adverse impact upon such sites. In this respect, a two-pronged approach has been 
adopted by RFMOs, encompassing restrictions on both current and prospective fisheries. 
First, RFMOs have required participants to identify their existing fishing footprints—that is, 
those locations in which some fishing activity has previously been conducted—with strict 
controls and procedures subsequently established where a state wishes to extend this footprint 
by conducting exploratory fishing. Second, in addition to the application of the much-
maligned ‘move-on’ rule, such bodies have instituted fisheries closures in locations of known 
ecological sensitivity. 
A standard feature of RFMO practice has therefore been the mapping of the current 
extent of fished areas with the jurisdictional waters of the body in question. For example, in 
2008, NEAFC adopted an Interim Exploratory Bottom Fishing Protocol for New Bottom 
Fishing Areas.143 Under these arrangements, NEAFC maintains a definitive, yet adjustable, 
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list of existing fishing footprints. These footprints can be extended, but any activities 
conducted therein are classed as ‘exploratory’ and subject to prior approval, based on the 
submission of a notice of intent to fish, alongside a harvesting plan, mitigation plan, and a 
‘sufficient system’ to record data.144 Similar systems have been established by SEAFO,145 the 
NFPC,146 the SPRFMO,147 and, especially, the CCAMLR,148 on whose pioneering system of 
exploratory fisheries such procedures have been largely modelled.149 
In practice, this represents a precautionary ‘trade-off,’ involving the approval of a 
highly limited degree of what is essentially research fishing under strictly controlled 
conditions in exchange for returning an agreed volume of data to the relevant advisory bodies 
of the RFMO. This process of data collection has been likened to a rudimentary version of 
environmental assessment.150 As established in the UNGA resolutions, environmental 
assessments related to these processes are required to be made public and to consider not just 
the individual impact of the fishery but also its cumulative effect in tandem with other 
anthropogenic activities. For exploratory fisheries, most RFMOs have sought to strike a 
balance between scientific transparency and commercial confidentiality, publishing in effect 
a series of edited highlights while retaining the full documentation in-house. Nevertheless, 
assessment documentation can be highly variable, ranging from the extensive to the 
superficial.151 Likewise, concerns have been raised that assessments of cumulative impacts 
have been generally marginalized, notwithstanding more comprehensive submissions to the 
SPRFMO and the CCAMLR.152 This has, however, been an enduring problem even for well-
managed exploratory fisheries, where fishers have focused on gathering data on the target 
stock rather than on the wider marine ecosystem.153 
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The second main strategy has been the designation of restricted areas for bottom 
fishing. In this respect, a significant volume of area closures have been instituted by NEAFC, 
NAFO, SEAFO, and the CCAMLR. Moreover, the GFCM has established three separate 
fisheries restricted areas for a more modest volume of territory—representative of the rather 
abbreviated pockets of ABNJ in these waters—but has also imposed a long-standing 
prohibition on bottom trawling in any area below 1,000 metres.154 Formal closures have not 
yet been instituted by the most recently created RFMOs—the SPRFMO and the NPFC—
although this consideration of VMEs, including the prospective designation of geographical 
restrictions, remain a significant operational priority. Meanwhile, perhaps most intriguingly, a 
series of benthic protected areas (BPAs) have been established within the Southern Indian 
Ocean. While SIOFA has not yet implemented formal area closures, a mosaic of thirteen 
voluntary BPAs have been instituted by the Southern Indian Ocean Deep-Sea Fisheries 
Association (SIODFA) with respect to the five leading companies operating in these waters. 
 
<H1>V. CHALLENGES OF FUTURE INTEGRATION 
 
In recent years, the need to promote greater practical and institutional cohesion in discharging 
the mandates of multilateral regimes has become a significant priority for IEG. As the 
number of treaties and institutions exercising competence over components of the global 
environment has steadily proliferated, and new regulatory practices have become the norm 
for IEG,155 legal and logistical challenges have been encountered in consolidating and 
coordinating conservation strategies and priorities.156 Thus far, the complications associated 
with the increasing fragmentation of IEG have been primarily explored by pursuing strategic 
alignments and coordinated working partnerships between treaties with a clear degree of 
commonality between their respective mandates.157 Given the emphasis upon institutional 
symbiosis within the ILBI, future arrangements for ABNJ are poised to follow this broad 
trend.  
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Nevertheless, policy actions concerning ABNJ have been generally developed by 
individual actors operating largely in isolation to each other, focusing on a particular sectoral 
challenges, such as the management of specific fishing activities, the prospective extraction 
of submarine mineral resources, or the regulation of certain shipping practices. Thus, as 
David Freestone observes, ‘[e]ach of these approaches has value, but each is developed and 
assessed by its own epistemic community; it is not developed with any reference to the work 
of other sectoral bodies.’158 Similarly, there has been little tradition of integrative practices 
between fisheries and environmental regulators at the regional and global levels, a trend that 
is also widely replicated on a domestic basis.159 Hence, in the present context, the underlying 
philosophy of the prospective ILBI represents a different challenge for IEG—namely, to 
foster effective methodologies to harness these sectoral approaches in a manner that benefits 
the management of ABNJ more holistically than has occurred in the past. 
The protection of VMEs therefore provides an intriguing context by which to consider 
the relationship between sectoral regulators and international and regional governance 
regimes. As noted above, in facilitating the objectives of the pertinent UNGA resolutions, a 
mosaic of areas closed to deep-sea bottom fishing has been established across an increasing 
number of locations in ABNJ. RFMOs, however, are not the only sectoral regulators with the 
capacity to restrict particular activities in designated places within ABNJ. The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), through its Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) concept, 
may identify locations that require special attention due to their inherent ecological, socio-
economic, or scientific attributes and could be adversely affected by the impacts of shipping. 
Moreover, the IMO considers that PSSAs are most appropriately established in areas for 
which there is a degree of pre-existing environmental protection, 160 thereby providing further 
impetus to develop a more cohesive relationship with protected areas established by other 
actors. As yet, no such areas have been identified within ABNJ, although the global 
legitimacy of the IMO would provide a clear regulatory basis to do so in the future.161 
Similarly, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) (which, by definition, operates solely in 
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ABNJ) may preclude seabed mining for certain locations and establish MPA-like protected 
areas, with a series of areas of particular environmental interest having been deployed 
throughout the Clarion-Clipperton Zone.162 As with the area closures adopted by RFMOs to 
protect VMEs, any sectoral restrictions instituted by the IMO or ISA apply solely to the 
particular activity in question. Thus, while they provide protection to a marine area, they are 
not MPAs. Conversely, other regional regulators (notably the array of regional seas 
agreements) have some capacity to establish MPAs, but they are generally divested of the 
competence to regulate specific sectoral activities in these locations.163 Therefore, in the 
context of the ILBI, there is strong encouragement for areas subject to sectoral restrictions to 
be more closely integrated with other forms of protected areas, such as those developed by 
regional institutions, and, indeed, the initiatives of other sectoral regulators.164  
This process remains at a nascent stage, although tentative connections have emerged 
within particular regions, which suggests that integrative practices can be developed to some 
degree for VMEs in ABNJ through partnerships between pre-existing regimes. The most 
prominent example is the pioneering relationship between the OSPAR Commission and 
NEAFC, whose respective jurisdictional purviews overlap within the northeast Atlantic 
region and include a significant portion of ABNJ. As noted above, NEAFC has long been 
preoccupied with the environmental impacts of deep-sea fishing, although its legal mandate 
remains confined to fisheries management. Meanwhile, since 1998, with the adoption of a 
new Annex V to the OSPAR Convention, the OSPAR Commission has extended its purview 
to include ‘non-polluting human activities’ that can adversely affect marine ecosystems, 
although this strictly excludes any consideration of fisheries or shipping,165 for which the 
Commission’s responsibilities are limited to bringing such issues to the attention of other 
bodies with the requisite legal competence. In discharging this mandate, the OSPAR 
Commission has placed considerable emphasis upon establishing a network of protected 
areas, particularly in ABNJ, and has a comparatively lengthy history of promoting 
                                                          
162 See A Jaeckel, ‘An Environmental Management Strategy for the International Seabed Authority? The Legal 
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interactions with other organizations in this capacity.166 With both organizations sharing a 
mutual interest in the protection of deep-water ecosystems and each holding different pieces 
of the jurisdictional jigsaw, there is clear scope for the OSPAR Commission and NEAFC to 
work collaboratively towards the further protection of deep-sea VMEs in this region. 
In 2008, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was concluded between NEAFC 
and the OSPAR Commission to explore areas of mutual interest and formalize a basis for 
potential future collaboration.167 The MOU is a concise document emphasizing the 
complementary, but individual, mandates of both organizations. Nevertheless, a series of 
potential interactions were outlined, including cooperation over human activities, marine 
spatial planning, area management, and scientific assessment. Thus far, the most significant 
outcome of these interactions has been the conclusion in 2014 of a collective arrangement on 
cooperation on marine protected areas in ABNJ.168 In 2009, NEAFC had closed a series of 
areas to bottom fishing that broadly corresponded to the designations within the OSPAR 
MPA network, notably within the Charlie Gibbs and Mid-Atlantic Ridge MPAs. The 
collective arrangement therefore addresses particular locations of mutual interest within the 
region, which are outlined in Annex I and are jointly maintained by both organizations. While 
not exclusively focused on VMEs or, indeed, the deep-sea environment—though promising 
lines of cooperation have also emerged for marine litter and shark conservation—the 
collective arrangement provides a platform for data exchange and updates on amendments to 
the respective restricted areas, with annual meetings having been convened since 2015 to 
promote these objectives further. 
The OSPAR/NEAFC arrangements illustrate both the opportunities and the 
challenges facing the prospective ILBI in facilitating collaborative exchanges of this nature. 
Significantly, the collective arrangement is not intended to operate bilaterally and seeks to 
incorporate additional actors, since the Annex I areas could also be compromised by other 
sectoral activities, notably seabed mining or shipping, which are regulated in isolation to 
these considerations. The OSPAR Commission and NEAFC have therefore encouraged the 
IMO and ISA to join this process, albeit with little success. Attempts to court the IMO have 
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been stymied by incompatible meeting schedules169 and, more ominously, opposition from 
IMO participants disinterested in the region.170 Meanwhile, the ISA has maintained informal 
contact with the collective arrangement but has also faced internal scepticism from 
participants favouring a clearly defined project-based role over the more philosophical virtues 
of open-ended institutional interaction.171 Moreover, concerns have been raised within the 
OSPAR Commission that promoting cross-sectoral management ultimately constitutes just 
one aspect of an extensive portfolio of activities that it is unable to prioritize without 
compromising the implementation of its wider mandate.172  
Tellingly, however, few parallel initiatives have emerged in other regions. Indeed, the 
regulatory conditions that have proved conducive to such synergies in the northeast 
Atlantic—namely, two bodies with complementary legal and geographical competences, 
accompanied by sufficient financial and political capital—are not necessarily replicated 
across the full cohort of regions in which RFMOs have addressed policies towards VMEs. 
Thus far, such institutional synergies have only been progressed (and to a rather more modest 
degree) within the Mediterranean region. In this regard, the GFCM has sought to promote a 
greater degree of coherence with the network of specially protected areas of Mediterranean 
importance established under the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean.173 However, this has not as yet yielded 
integrated management policies specifically for VMEs in the region. Instead, these initiatives 
have primarily focused on addressing by-catches of marine mammals in the Mediterranean, 
although this suggests that the institutional treatment of VMEs can also have beneficial side-
effects for marine conservation problems in ABNJ that are unconnected with vulnerable 
deep-sea ecosystems. 
 
<H1>VI. CONCLUSION 
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The ‘uninvaded sleep’ of the denizens of the deep-water ecosystems imagined by Alfred 
Tennyson has become increasingly illusory in recent years as anthropogenic activities have 
steadily proliferated in the marine environment. One of the most troubling manifestations of 
this trend has been the poorly regulated expansion of fisheries into the deep seas in ABNJ, 
which has had a devastating impact upon particular ecosystems and fish stocks. Deep-sea 
stocks and ecosystems represent a significant challenge for the purported precautionary 
management of marine resources, with their exploitation conducted in a context of strikingly 
limited baseline information as to the resilience of such areas and species to prospective 
fishing. This has been compounded by alarming governance gaps exposed by the pursuit of 
deep-sea fishing in ABNJ, notably a lack of effective and competent institutions, an 
accompanying failure of coordinated regional and global regulation, and a significant volume 
of illegal and unregulated activity.  
More optimistically, since the turn of the present century, there has been a concerted 
international effort to address these governance failings and to develop a clear and 
coordinated response to the challenges raised by the pursuit of vulnerable deep-sea fish 
stocks and the resultant impacts upon the fragile ecosystems in which they are located. To 
this end, a suite of commitments has been developed incrementally through the UNGA to be 
implemented primarily through a growing number of RFMOs exercising competences over 
the high seas, for which encouraging progress has occurred towards the further development 
of a coherent and effective regulatory framework for these unique ecosystems.  
Most tangibly, the volume of RFMO coverage has increased dramatically over the 
past decade, steadily filling a regulatory vacuum for ABNJ with a series of tessellating 
regimes exercising a more extensive set of competences over fish stocks and marine 
ecosystems. While this process was initiated primarily through the adoption of the UNFSA, 
the impact of the UNGA VME resolutions should not be understated as a regulatory catalyst. 
This has facilitated a series of unilateral innovations, not only by the EU in areas presenting 
particular governance challenges but also by elements of the fishing industry itself. In this 
way, the UNGA commitments can be viewed with increasing confidence as representing a set 
of recognized minimum standards for fishing activities in ABNJ, as evidenced by their 
prominent consideration in the development of new arrangements for the high seas. The 
closure of governance gaps has been accompanied by the elaboration of effective standards 
for the growing volume of exploratory fishing conducted in VMEs as well as an increasing 
number of area closures in regions of particular ecological sensitivity. 
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Nevertheless, considerable challenges remain, not only in the specific regulatory 
context of the deep-sea environment but also for the prospective governance of marine 
biodiversity in ABNJ more holistically. The UNGA commitments remain far from fulfilled 
on a global basis, notwithstanding laudable examples of good regional practices. Concerns 
remain over the effectiveness of encounter protocols, for which the operational thresholds 
have exhibited flaws, and a reliance upon ‘move-on’ rules has proved at best to be an 
inefficient mitigation strategy. Accordingly, a significant volume of fishing may be 
legitimately conducted in areas of acute ecological sensitivity—or, perhaps more accurately, 
in areas in which there is insufficient data to gauge the full implications of such activities 
upon VMEs—while current fisheries footprints remain large (wherein lesser restrictions are 
imposed upon prospective fishing), and a number of RFMOs have yet to initiate area closures 
for large swathes of the global oceans. The success of encounter protocols is contingent upon 
the exhaustive mapping of enormous areas of the global seabed, a forbidding task in practice 
given the financial and logistical implications of conducting such activities in remote, hostile, 
and extreme environments. In the meantime, an uneasy compromise between continued 
fishing and a reliance upon the limited scientific data currently and prospectively available 
constitutes the most practical application of precautionary fisheries management in this 
context. 
Ultimately, while the coalescence of international standards for the regulation of 
deep-sea bottom fisheries represents an intriguing contemporary case study of the governance 
of marine ecosystems located in ABNJ, it is also suggestive of wider lessons for the operation 
of the nascent ILBI. With its stated philosophy to work symbiotically with existing structures 
and processes, yet ‘not undermine’ these regimes, the ILBI faces considerable practical 
challenges in aligning holistic conservation strategies for marine biodiversity in ABNJ. The 
experience thus far of promoting developing strategic alignments between sectoral initiatives 
and regional environmental regulators suggests that such synergies may yield qualified 
successes. The northeast Atlantic context demonstrates that fisheries closures can dovetail 
effectively with MPAs within ABNJ and present clear opportunities to exchange valuable 
data, promote technical collaboration, and facilitate a more coherent form of area-based 
management. Conversely, it reveals a marked reluctance on the part of global regulators—
whose mandates are exercised in conjunction with interests far removed from the locus of 
regional activities—to actively participate in the process, alongside internal pressures to 
recognize that collaborative initiatives for ABNJ represent a significant, but small, element of 
the suite of responsibilities exercised by sectoral and regional bodies. While the emerging 
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ILBI may have much to commend it, not least in its commitment to bolstering the oversight 
of evolving regulatory problems for which the UNCLOS framework has proved to be 
inadequate and dated, the pursuit of its ambitions towards facilitating a more streamlined 
approach to the international governance of the marine environment in ABNJ may ultimately 
prove to be rather more circumspect. 
